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Abstract
We study an income tax enforcement problem using a principal-agent model where the
government sets the tax and inspection functions. These are announced to the agents and
there is no commitment problem. The penalty function for dishonest taxpayers is given
exogenously and satisfies certain social norms. We prove that, for a large family of penalty
functions, this policy is such that honesty implies regressiveness. This result does not depend
on the fact that agents know the true probability of inspection.
1. Introduction
The fact that agents in an economy have private information sets impor-
tant constraints on the kind of policies a government can achieve. An
example of this phenomenon is the optimal income taxation problem
where agents differ in their abilities to transform labor into income. The
government cannot observe this ability and such an asymmetry of informa-
tion restricts its policies as compared with the ideal case where it has
complete information.
We study the case in which the government knows the distribution of
income of the population but can only know the income of each specific
agent by carrying out a perfect, but costly, tax inspection. In general, only
a fraction of the agents will be audited, thereby creating the possibility of
tax evasion. The tax paid by an agent depends on her own income level
report. In addition, a penalty is imposed on those agents who are found to
be dishonest. The problem faced by the government is to find the optimal
tax schedule, taking into account the enforcement costs associated
with it.
The enforcement problem becomes trivial if there are no bounds on the
admissible penalties: the government would audit all agents with a very
small probability and impose an extremely high penalty on dishonest
agents. This scheme would approximate the complete information case.
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Our objective is to characterize the optimal audit probabilities and tax
scheme when the penalty function is exogenously given to the principal,
but drawn from a large admissible set. To avoid the above kind of situation,
we require the admissible functions to satisfy three conditions that we
believe are natural in most societies: (i) there is a maximum penalty given
by the true income of the agent, (ii) audited dishonest agents pay at least
the same amount as an honest agent on the same income level, and (iii) the
punishment imposed fits the crime; see Klepper and Nagin (1989) for a
non-technical discussion of the tradeoffs between compliance and
taxation.
The main technical difficulty in our approach is that we cannot prove the
revelation principle, so a general analysis becomes quite intractable. Thus,
we concentrate on characterizing the optimal policy among those who tell
the truth. However, if we believe that an objective of society is to design
policies which induce honest behavior, then the conclusion of our analysis
is that an efficient policy cannot be both honest and progressive, i.e., if the
optimal policy is to tell the truth, then the average tax is a decreasing
function of income.
This approach may be criticized on the grounds that, in reality, taxpayers
do not know the auditing policy with enough accuracy. Our result still
holds in models where agents have beliefs about the auditing probabilities
which do not need to be correct: if the optimal policy induces honesty (and
the government knows it) then it must be regressive.
Recent studies on optimal income taxation have addressed this problem
in analogous settings; see e.g. Reinganum and Wilde (1985), Border and
Sobel (1987) and Mookherjee and Png (1989). Others, such as Sanchez
and Sobel (1993) and Cremer, Marchand and Pestieau (1990), character-
ize the optimal policy for similar models in which a specific penalty func-
tion is given for the government. However, as pointed out by Chander and
Wilde (1993), the penalty could be more than the true income of a
taxpayer.
Chander and Wilde (1993) analyze a similar model. They consider four
cases, each associated with a different kind of restriction on the set of
admissible penalties (in two of them, some rewards are allowed). None of
these penalties is too severe in the sense that the penalty imposed on a
dishonest agent cannot be greater than her income. Assuming that the
government and the agents are risk neutral, in all four cases they show that
the optimal tax scheme induces a concave and non-decreasing ‘‘payment
function’’.
One possible objection to the first case studied by Chander and Wilde
(1993), i.e., when the penalty function is exogenously given to the govern-
ment, is that they consider only a very specific penalty function. Moreover,
that function is not always a penalty because it allows for cases in which an
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agent who is found to be dishonest ends up paying less taxes than an honest
agent with the same initial income. The rest of the cases analyzed by
Chander and Wilde, i.e., when the penalty function is endogenously deter-
mined, hold for a large set of penalties. However, as the authors show, if
the government is free to choose the penalties, the most severe (the
so-called ‘‘draconian’’) penalty function will be adopted: whenever an
agent is found to be dishonest she will have to pay her total income.
Hence, the penalty assigned to a dishonest agent does not depend on the
amount misreported. In most real-life economies, however, there are
social norms against this kind of punishment, not only because it is too
‘severe’’, but also because it is not continuous and therefore not in agree-
ment with the principle that ‘‘punishment should fit the crime’’.
II. The Model
We consider a population of taxpayers (agents) whose income is distri-
buted along an interval [0, M] according to a measure, m, on that interval.
The measure m could be non-atomic or discrete, so we allow for a contin-
uum or a discrete number of agents. We assume that the functions
considered below are m-integrable. We identify the type of agent by her
income and let yb [0, M] denote the agent with income y.
The government (principal) collects taxes from the agents, according to
a mapping t : [0, M]hR which depends on their (reported) income.
Assumption 1. The tax function t : [0, M]hR satisfies 0Rt(x)R x.
Taxpayers observe their income costlessly and they file an income report
with the government. The principal knows m but it can detect misreporting
only by randomly inspecting taxpayers at a cost per inspection of ca0. The
government announces a random inspection policy according to a certain
probability function p(x) : [0, M]h [0, 1] and can credibly commit to it.
The true income of a monitored taxpayer is revealed when she is
inspected. Whenever taxpayer yb [0, M] reports income xb [0, M] and is
not inspected, then the government collects from her the amount t(x). If
she reports income x and is audited, then she has to pay the amount
f(x, y) = t( y)+ft(x, y), where ft(x, y) = h(x, t(x); y, t( y)) is the punishment
imposed on agent y in addition to her own taxes.
We assume that the penalty ft at most depends only on the type of agent,
y, the amount she should have paid according to the law, t( y), the type she
announces, x, and the corresponding tax, t(x). Thus, h : R4+hR and
h(u, v; r, s) is interpreted as the punishment imposed on agent r, whom the
law requires to pay s for declaring herself as being of type u and having to
pay v. Note that we are only fixing a functional form of f, i.e., the value of
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f(x, y) might depend on the particular tax function t as well as on x and y.
To emphasize this dependency we write t explicitly, as a subscript of f.
Assumption 2. For each uEv, rEs the following hold:
(a) The mapping h(u, v; r, s) is continuous, non-decreasing in r, s and non-
increasing in u and v.
(b) 0Rh(u, v; r, s)Rrµs and h(u, v; u, v) = 0.
It follows that the function f t(x, y) satisfies the following properties:
(i) 0Rf t(x, y)Ryµt( y).
(ii) For x fixed, f t(x, y) is non-decreasing in y.
(iii) For y fixed, f t(x, y) is non-increasing in x.
(iv) f t( y, y) = 0.
Condition (i) guarantees that no agent is required to pay more than her
true income. It also implies that f t is always a penalty, i.e., the amount paid
by a monitored dishonest agent is at least the same as what she would have
to pay when reporting truthfully.
Whenever two agents misreport the same income, property (ii) requires
the one with the greater wealth to pay a higher penalty. According to (iii),
the smaller an agent claims her wealth to be, the higher the penalty she
would have to pay on inspection. These restrictions may appear unnatural
if the tax function t(x) is decreasing. However, in the next section we will
see that the optimal tax function and the monitoring probability must both
be nondecreasing, even for penalty functions which do not necessarily
satisfy (ii) and (iii) above.
Finally, (iv) rules out rewards or punishments for truthfully reporting
one’s own type. If this property is not assumed, the results in Border and
Sobel (1987) suggest that rewards for truthful reporting would be part of
the optimal tax system. In view of horizontal equity and since we will only
consider ‘‘truth-telling’’ tax policies, property (iv) seems to be a natural
assumption.
Thus, given tax system w = (t, p, f ), if agent y reports income x, her
expected taxes will be
s(x, y) = (1µp(x))t(x)+p(x) f(x, y) (1)
and she chooses her report x so as to minimize s(x, y). That is, agents are
risk neutral and know the inspection policy p(x).
Our assumptions imply that an agent with income y will not report z if
t(z)at( y). Thus, a rational agent is never required to pay more than her
income regardless of whether she is inspected or not. Let us define:
a( y) = {zb [0, M]: for each xb [0, M], s(z, y)Rs(x, y)}.
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Assumption 3. We only consider tax systems w = (t, p, f ), such that for each
yb [0, M], a( y)8\.
This assumption holds whenever there is a finite number of agents. The
fact that a( y) may contain more than one element will not alter the analysis
below. For simplicity, we assume that one element in a( y) is chosen (e.g.
take sup a( y)) and think of a as being single valued. We also assume that
if yba( y), then agent y will report honestly.
Hence, given a tax system w = (t, p, f ), the expected transfer of money
from agent y to the government will be given by T( y) = s(a( y), y) and the
net revenue of the government is given by the expression:
R(w) = P [0, M] (T( y)µcp(a( y))) dm. (2)
The penalty function h is imposed exogenously on the government, for
example by the legal system or some other institution not contemplated in
the model. Given a fixed penalty function h, the government chooses a
policy, (t, p) satisfying assumptions 1, 2 and 3 and such that the tax system
w = (t, p, f ) maximizes R(w). Hence, the principal is also risk neutral and it
is not concerned with distributional issues.
Definition. Given a fixed penalty function h, we say that the policy (t, p) is
optimal if R(t, p, f )ER(¯t, p¯, f ) for any other policy (¯t, p¯). A tax function t is
said to be regressive if t(x)/x is decreasing.
III. Main Results
We now turn to a partial characterization of the optimal policy. In contrast
with some of the earlier literature, our analysis covers the characterization
of the optimal policy for each, arbitrary but fixed, penalty function drawn
from a large set of admissible ones. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, we
suppose the assumptions made in the preceding section hold.
From (1) we see that agent y will prefer not to declare income x as long
as the government inspects type x with probability p(x) greater than
p(x)E
t( y)µt(x)
f (x, y)µt(x)
= Q(x, t(x); y, t( y))
where, for a fixed penalty function h, we define Q(u, v; r, s) as
Q(u, v; r, s) =8 sµvh(u, v; r, s)+sµv0 if vRsotherwise
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Thus, for each x, yb [0, M] such that t(x)st( y), the amount
Q(x, t(x); y, t( y)) measures the ‘‘incentives’’ of agent y to report income x.
The set of admissible penalty functions we study is given by those which
satisfy, in addition to assumption 2, the following:
Assumption 4. The penalty function h satisfies:
(i) If vRusrRr0, sRr, vRsss0Rr0 and
v
u
E
s0
r0
E
s
r
then Q(u, v; r0, s0)EQ(u, v; r, s), with strict inequality if s0 /r0as/r.
(ii) If vRv0ss then Q(u, v; r, s)EQ(u, v0; r, s).
In other words, suppose two agents r0 and r, with r0ar, are considering
the possibility of reporting themselves as being of type usr, with an
obligation to pay v. And assume that the mean tax imposed on agent r0 (i.e.,
s0 /r0) is greater than the same quantity for agent r (i.e., s/r). Then, assump-
tion 4 (i) implies that it will be more difficult to persuade agent r0 than
agent r to tell the truth, in the sense that p(u), the probability of inspection,
has to be higher in order to dissuade her from misreporting u.
On the other hand, assumption 4 (ii) says that, provided vRv0ss, raising
taxes for agent u, from v to v0 makes reporting u less attractive for any
other agent rau.
In order to exemplify the penalty functions satisfying hypotheses 4
above, we begin by examining some penalty functions considered previ-
ously in the literature.
Example A. The penalty function
f1(x, y) = G
t(x)+yµx,
t( y)
xRy
xEy
studied in Chander and Wilde (1993), can be obtained from
h1(u, v; r, s) = G
vµs+rµu,
0
r8u
r = u
.
The penalty function
f2(x, y) = G
t(x)+(1+p) (t( y)µt(x)),
t( y)
xRy
xEy
considered in Sanchez and Sobel (1993)‚ also satisfies assumption 4. Here,
p is the ‘‘penalty rate’’.
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Example B. Let 0saR1 and take C : [0, l)h [0, l) non-decreasing such
that C(y)R2M(yµ1) if yR1 and C(y) = 0 otherwise (this restriction is
imposed to assure that h is non-increasing in v). The mappings
h3(u, v; r, s) =G
C(r/s)v2µC(r/s)vs+a(rµs) (1µv/s),
0
vRs
vas
correspond to the penalty functions
f3(x, y) =8t( y)+C( y/t( y))t
2(x)µC( y/t( y))t(x)t( y)+a( yµt( y))
Å(1µ(t(x)/t( y))), xRy
t( y) xay
which include all those which are linear and quadratic in t(x). Varying CE0
changes the convexity of the penalty f3(x, y). For C = 0, the resulting
penalty is linear in t(x), whereas C large corresponds to very convex
penalties. Alternatively, the mapping
f4(x, y) = G
t( y)+a( yµxµt( y)+(x/y)t( y)),
t( y)
xRy
xay
also satisfies 4. In this case, the punishment is linear in the amount of tax
the agent is trying to evade.
The following result is similar to that of Krasa and Villamil (1994), who
study an optimal contracting model with costly verification technology and
non-identical, possibly risk averse agents. They show that the transfer
mapping, as well as the monitoring probabilities, are decreasing functions
of wealth. In their model, ‘‘it is optimal to punish an agent ( . . . ) by seizing
the entire endowment for misreporting’’ (p. 178). In contrast, we focus on
whether qualitatively similar results hold whenever social norms impose
economic restrictions on the penalty functions.
Proposition 1. Let h be a penalty function satisfying assumptions 2 (b) and 4.
Suppose the tax policy w = (t, p, f ) is optimal and induces honest reporting.
Then, t is non-decreasing and p is non-increasing.
Proof: Suppose t is not non-decreasing and let y, zb [0, M], such that zsy
and t(z)at( y). Then, t(z)/zat( y)/y and it follows from assumption 4 (i) that
Q(x, t(x); z, t(z))aQ(x, t(x); y, t( y)). Since (t, p, f ) induces truthful report-
ing, we have that
p(x)E sup
t(y)at(x)
t(y)µt(x)
f(x, y)µt(x)
= sup
t(y)at(x)
Q(x, t(x); y, t(y))
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for all xb [0, M]. Let xb [0, M] such that t(z)at(x). Then
p(x)EQ(x, t(x); z, t(z)) and since t(z)at( y), we also have that
p(x)EQ(x, t(x); z, t(z))aQ(x, t(x); y, t( y)). Hence, the incentive constraints
for agent y are not binding.
We can raise her taxes by a small amount such that her incentives will
continue to be non-binding.This will not change her report and will not
induce other agents to revise their reports either. Raising taxes for agent y
will yield a higher revenue for the government at the same cost, contra-
dicting the optimality of (t, p, f ). Hence, t must be non-decreasing. Since
(t, p, f ) is optimal, we have that p(x) = supt( y)at(x)Q(x, t(x); y, t( y)) is non-
increasing. h
We can now state the main result. A similar result has already been
obtained by Chander and Wilde (1993) for some particular penalty func-
tions. One difference with the approach taken here is that we consider a
tax function be regressive if the average tax, rather than the marginal tax,
is decreasing. In addition, we restrict ourselves to tax policies which induce
truthful reporting since, in the present context, the revelation principle
does not necessarily hold.
Theorem. Let h be a fixed penalty function and let (t, p, f ) be an optimal tax
policy such that assumption 4 holds. Then, either (t, p, f ) does not induce
truthful reporting, or else t is regressive.
Proof: Given a tax function t(x) define
t*(x) = x sup G
t(z)
z
: zExH.
Note that t*(x)/x is decreasing and for each xb [0, M], t(x)Rt*(x)Rx. The
proof of the theorem is now a straightforward consequence of proposition
1 and the following:
Proposition 2. If the tax function t is non-decreasing and the tax system
w = (t, p, f ) satisfies assumption 4 and induces truthful reporting, then t* is
non-decreasing, continuous and (t*, p, ft*) induces truthful reporting.
Proof: See Appendix.
One possible criticism to the approach above is that agents need to know
the inspection rate. We show next that the same result holds, even if the
agents have only imperfect information on p(x), as long as the government
knows the beliefs of the agents about p(x). Let us modify our model as
follows. Taxpayer y may not know the function p(x). Rather, she thinks that
the probability of being inspected when she reports her income to be x is
given by some probability function p y(x).
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Consequently, given a tax system w = (t, p, f ), agent y will not seek to
minimize s(x, y) given in equation (1), but she will rather attempt to
minimize
s y(x, y) = t(x)+p y(x) ( f(x, y)µt(x)). (3)
Since the proof of proposition 2 shows that replacing t(x) by t*(x) does not
change the incentives of the agents to misreport, our previous reasoning
still applies. Of course, nothing could now be said about the true
probability of inspection p(x), without further information relating p(x)
and p y(x).
Proposition 3. Let h be a penalty function satisfying assumptions 2 and 4 and
suppose all the agents have the same beliefs on p(x) (i.e., p y(x) = pz(x) for all
y and z), the tax policy w = (t, p, f ) is optimal and induces honest reporting.
Then, t is non-decreasing and regressive.
One possible scenario in which the analysis above may apply is when
agents have some indirect information about the probability of inspection.
For example, the number of tax inspectors is public and hence, the total
number of inspections which can be carried out, say n, can be estimated by
the agents. Let N be the number of taxpayers. It is not unreasonable to
assume that all agents believe that the probability of being inspected is
constant and given by p¯ = n/N. Even though this may not be the real
inspection policy designed by the government, agents have no further
information about it. Of course, the beliefs of the agents have to be
consistent with the monitoring policy adopted by the government, which
has to be able to commit to it. But now the commitment is in the ‘‘signal’’
agents observe and not in the actual probability of inspection. This
commitment capacity can be justified by the same arguments used in the
standard case where agents observe the true inspection function.
Finally, we examine other alternatives for the government’s objective.
Recall that in the above discussion the goal of the principal is to find a tax
policy which maximizes net revenue R(w) given by equation (2). An
alternative approach would be to consider the following problem: given a
penalty function h, find a tax policy w = (t, p, f ) which collects a fixed
target revenue, R(w), at a minimum cost.
We argue that if the government restricts itself to honest tax policies and
m has a continuous density on [0, M], then the optimal tax function for this
problem must be regressive as well. Indeed, suppose h satisfies assumption
4 and w = (t, p) is a solution to the problem, which induces truthful
reporting. If t is not regressive, we may apply proposition 2 to obtain a new
tax function t*(x) which yields a higher revenue at the same cost. Thus,
letting w* = (t*, p), we must have that R(w*)aR(w). Since t* is continuous
and m has a continuous density, there is x0 b [0, M] such that
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P
x0
0
t*( y) dm+t*(x0)m([x0, M]) = R(w).
It is straightforward to verify that the policy
t¯(x) =G
t*(x) if xRx0
t*(x0) if xEx0
and p¯(x) =G
p(x)
0
if xRx0
if xEx0
induces truthful reporting and produces the same revenue as R(w) at a
lower cost. This proof can easily be adapted to the discrete case.
IV. Final Comments
In an income tax enforcement model with a principal that has the
capability to set the tax and inspection functions, we proved that if the
optimal policy is to tell the truth, then: (i) the tax policy is continuous, non-
decreasing and regressive, and (ii) the inspection function is non-increas-
ing. Assertion (i) does not depend on whether agents know the true
probability of inspection.
These results are related to those of Chander and Wilde (1993). The
main difference is that ours apply to any penalty function drawn from a
large set of penalties satisfying certain ‘‘social norms’’. Thus, the model
and the reasoning behind the proofs change substantially. The intuitive
explanation of Chander and Wilde’s results, based on the specific penalty
functions they consider, is that in an optimal policy, the audit probability at
any point equals the marginal tax rate of the agent in question.
In order to explain the intuition in our model, suppose there are only
three types of agents xsysz, and suppose the government has imple-
mented a certain tax policy. Our assumptions imply that if t(z)/zat( y)/y,
then the incentives for z to report x are higher than the incentives for y to
file the same report. Thus, provided the tax policy designed induces honest
reporting, the probability of inspection p(x) cannot be binding for agent y.
It follows that the government can now increase the tax for agents with rent
y and the tax policy we started with could not possibly be optimal.
The introduction of risk averse agents, as in Krasa and Villamil (1994),
additional information about the taxpayer and the study of dishonest
optimal policies are important topics for further research.
Appendix. Proof of Proposition 2
Let xsy and suppose t*(x)at*( y). Then we can find x0Ex such that for each
zEy
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x
t(x0)
x0
ay
t(z)
z
.
Taking z = y we obtain xt(x0)/x0at( y). But this is impossible since x/x0R1 and
t(x0)Rt( y). Hence, t* is non-decreasing.
Let xRy. We show next that t*(x) does not change the incentives for y. It is
enough to prove that p(x)EQ(x, t*(x); y, t*( y)).
First, if t( y) = t*( y), then applying assumption 4 (ii) and taking into account
that t(x)Rt*(x) and t induces truthful reporting, we have p(x)EQ(x, t(x);
y, t( y))aQ(x, t*(x); y, t*( y)) so y prefers not to declare herself as being of
type x.
Otherwise, t( y)st*( y). Take a sequence {an}
l
n=1 contained in ( y, M) and such
that
t(an)
an
a
t( y)
y
and lim
nhl
t(an)
an
=
t*( y)
y
.
It follows that for each nbN, t(an)Et( y). By a compactness argument, we may
assume the sequence converges to, say, zb [ y, M]. Thus, {t(an)}ln=1 also converges
and
lim
nhl
t(an) = z
t*( y)
y
Rz.
Since (t, p, f ) induces truthful reporting, for each nbN, we have
p(x)EQ(x, t(x); an, t(an)). Taking limits we obtain that
p(x)EQ(x, t(x); z, z
t*( y)
y
.
We now apply assumption 4 (ii) with u = x, v = t(x), r = z, s = zt*( y)/y, v0 = t*(x)
to obtain:
Q Ax, t(x); z, z
t*( y)
y BEQAx, t*(x); z, z
t*( y)
y B .
We then use 4 (i) with u = x, v = t*(x), r = y, s = t*( y), r0 = z, s0 = zt*( y)/y.
So t*(x)RxsyRz, t*( y)Ry, zt*( y)/yRz and
v
u
=
t*(x)
x
E
s0
r0
=
t*( y)
y
=
s
r
.
Hence,
p(x)EQ Ax, t*(x); z, z
t*( y)
y BEQ(x, t*(x); y, t*( y))
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and it does not pay for agent y to declare herself as x. Since xRy was arbitrary, we
see that (t*, p) also induces truthful reporting.
We show that t* is continuous. Otherwise, since t* is non-decreasing, it can
have only jump discontinuities, i.e., if t* is discontinuous at x0 then
lim
xhxµ0
t*(x)s limxhx+0
t*(x)
so
lim
xhxµ0
t*(x)
x0
s lim
xhx+0
t*(x)
x0
.
But then t*(x)/x is increasing at x0. h
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